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Balancing the Interests of Researchers and 
Donors in the Commercial Scientific 
Research Marketplace 
In recent years, commercialization is becoming increasingly 
prevalent in the scientific research community.1 In this Note, 
“commercialization” refers to a situation where researchers profit from 
their scientific research, which is often publicly funded.2 For example, 
researchers may profit by selling products to the public developed from 
their results, such as pharmaceutical drugs.3 Additionally, researchers 
may profit by acquiring intellectual property rights as a result of their 
research, such as patents.4 While the government has taken affirmative 
actions to encourage the commercialization of science,5 there is 
significant opposition to this type of exploitation of research.6 Yet 
despite this growing opposition, many tissue donors are unaware of this 
on-going commercialization.7 If given a preference, these donors may 
prefer donating their tissues to researchers that would not use the 
research for profit. Indeed, in one study, almost one-third of participants 
indicated they would be against the patenting of products developed from 
  
 1 See The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Baye-Dole) Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-
211 (2000); Michael J. Malinowski, Technology Transfer in Biobanking: Credits, Debits, and 
Population Health Futures, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 54, 54-56 (2005) (describing the history of the 
commercialization of science); Eric G. Campbell, Greg Koski, & David Blumenthal, The Triple 
Helix: University, Government and Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences 10-12 (Working 
Policy Paper of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory Studies, 2004), available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/research-and-policy/triple-helix.aspx; see also infra Part I. 
 2 See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the 
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory 
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 126 (2007). Often researchers may 
profit from relationships with industry, such as “[r]esearch relationships,” “[c]onsulting 
relationships,” “[l]icensing relationships,” “[e]quity relationships,” “[t]raining relationships,” and 
“[g]ift relationships.” Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 3 Bouchard, supra note 2, at 126. For example, publicly-funded research led to the 
development of the five pharmaceutical drugs with the highest sales in 1995. Id. at 143-44. 
 4 See, e.g., id. at 124. For example, in 2002, U.S. universities brought in about $1 billion 
in licensing royalties from various patents resulting from research at the universities. Id. 
 5 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211; 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 6 See, e.g., Ken Gatter, Fixing Cracks: A Discourse Norm to Repair the Crumbling 
Regulatory Structure Supporting Clinical Research and Protecting Human Subjects, 73 UMKC L. 
REV. 581, 619 (2005); Melody Petersen, A Conversation with: Sheldon Krimsky; Uncoupling 
Campus and Company, N.Y. TIMES, at F2 (Sept. 23, 2003); see also infra Part II. 
 7 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (tissue donors expected research results would remain in the public 
domain). 
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research on their genetic material.8 Yet the current legal system is not 
adequately set up to ensure these donors’ interests are protected.9 
Many scholars have proposed methods to protect donors’ 
interests.10 Some of the most frequent proposals include unjust 
enrichment causes of action, expanded property rights in the donors’ 
tissues, and informed consent requirements.11 However, most of these 
proposals address only the protection of donors’ rights.12 They fail to 
acknowledge the interest on the other side—that of the researchers in 
performing their research with as few burdens as possible.13 As there are 
two interests involved, an adequate solution will require a balancing of 
these two interests.  
This Note argues that a mandatory disclosure requirement 
provides the best balance between donors’ interests and researchers’ 
interests. Part I describes the events contributing to the 
commercialization of science. These events include the passing of the 
Bayh-Dole Act14 and the expansion of patentable subject matter. Part II 
  
 8 Jon F. Merz & Pamela Sankar, DNA Banking: An Empirical Study of a Proposed 
Consent Form, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, & PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 198, 
211 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998). The study presented ninety-nine participants with a proposed 
informed consent form for providing blood and other tissues for storage in a DNA bank. Id. at 198, 
203. Participants were then asked numerous questions, including, “Assuming you were to permit 
research to be performed with your blood, would you be offended if researchers patent inventions 
resulting from this research (which gives them the ability to prevent others from making, using, or 
selling those inventions)?” Id. at 224. Twenty-nine participants responded yes out of a total of 
ninety-one respondents. Id. at 211. 
 9 See infra Part III. 
 10 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal 
Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 268 (2004) (proposing property rights will protect donors’ interests in 
their biological tissues); Debra L. Greenfield, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: Unjust 
Enrichment and the Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 213, 237 (2006) 
(suggesting unjust enrichment will provide a method of challenging some gene patents); Douglas 
Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39, 40 (2007) (arguing 
informed consent doctrine should be expanded to meet modern science’s needs); Melanie Baird, 
Note, When and Why Does What Belong to Whom? A Proposed Model for the International 
Protection of Human Donors of Biological Material, 32 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 331, 347-48 (2006) 
(proposing a combination of the informed consent and benefit-sharing models). 
 11 See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 10, at 268 (proposing property rights will protect donors’ 
interests in their biological tissues); Greenfield, supra note 10, at 237 (proposing unjust enrichment 
will provide a method of challenging gene patents in certain circumstances); Grimm, supra note 10, 
at 40 (arguing informed consent doctrine should be expanded to meet modern science’s needs). For 
an overview of other solutions proposed, see generally Joyce Boyle, To Pay or Not to Pay, That Is 
the Question: Finding an Intermediary Solution Among the Moore Spectrum, 7 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. 
& L. 55, 72-78 (2002). 
 12 But see William Hanes, Note, Rejection of the Need for Informed Consent in Prostate 
Tissue Sample Research, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 401, 424-26 (2008) (considering both 
researchers’ and donors’ interests and proposing a patchwork of causes of action in response to 
various concerns, but not directly requiring researchers to disclose financial interests). 
 13 This focus on donors’ rights is likely due to the fact that the federal government has 
already taken a strong interest in furthering research. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000); 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1092, 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also infra Part I. However, this does not justify going too far 
in the other extreme direction. 
 14 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-27 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200-211 (2000)). 
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addresses objections to the commercialization of science. Additionally, it 
describes Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute,15 a 
case in which the donors’ and researchers’ interests conflicted. Part III 
analyzes the potential effects of the proposed solutions on both donors 
and researchers. Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative solution that 
balances both interests involved and is modeled on the informed consent 
process. 
I. THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SCIENCE 
The changes in the scientific landscape in the past thirty years 
shed light on the difficulties the legal system faces in dealing with 
conflicts between donors of biological tissues to research and 
researchers. Prior to the 1980s, research universities and corporate 
entities rarely interacted with each other.16 However, in 1980, Congress 
passed the Bayh-Dole Act,17 which permitted organizations to keep the 
ownership rights of intellectual property developed through the use of 
public funds.18 At the same time, the scope of patentable subject matter 
expanded.19 These two factors led to a further commercialization of 
science by increasing the manners in which researchers could profit from 
their scientific results.20 As will be discussed in Part II, this resulted in 
increasing tensions between donors and researchers. 
A. The Bayh-Dole Act and Technology Transfer 
Prior to the 1980s, the government owned the vast majority of 
patents resulting from federally funded research.21 Researchers and 
companies could obtain title to the patents in certain circumstances, but 
each funding agency had a different policy for when it would grant a 
request.22 Furthermore, the government freely granted licenses to 
multiple parties using non-exclusive licenses.23 At the time, only 5% of 
federally owned patents were in use in the marketplace, or, in other 
  
 15 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 16 See infra Part I.A. 
 17 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-27 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200-211 (2000)). 
 18 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211; see also infra Part I.A. 
 19 See infra Part I.B. 
 20 See Bouchard, supra note 2, at 126; see also Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 4-6. 
 21 Council on Governmental Regulations, Office of Technology Transfer, The Bayh-
Dole Act: A Guide to the Law and Implementing Regulations (Sept. 1999), 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/faculty/bayh.html [hereinafter Guide to Bayh-Dole]. 
 22 Id.; Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/09/19/8272884/index.htm. 
 23 Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. A non-exclusive license permits the licensor to 
grant the same rights to multiple parties, whereas an exclusive license prohibits the licensor from 
granting the relevant rights to any additional parties. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938-39 (8th ed. 
2004) (entry for “license”). 
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words, were commercially available.24 Congress concluded the public 
would benefit economically from a change in policy,25 largely because 
they were concerned about the lack of commercial use of technological 
research.26 Congress believed that in order to encourage researchers and 
companies to take the additional risks involved in getting products into 
the marketplace, title to the patents and the ability to grant exclusive 
licenses was necessary.27 
As a result of these concerns, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole 
Act.28 The new policy, which became effective in 1981, left ownership of 
patents resulting from federally funded research in the hands of the 
research organization.29 Therefore, the research organization could 
control the issuance of licenses and receive profits from licenses.30 
Furthermore, the organization could issue exclusive licenses in certain 
circumstances.31 In other words, the organization could grant a certain 
right, such as use of a patented product, to a single entity.32 
Despite Congress’s conclusion that this new policy would be 
beneficial in advancing scientific research, academic institutions in 
particular remained skeptical into the 1990s.33 Many institutions were 
concerned that increased commercialization would threaten the cultural 
characteristics of academic institutions such as unbiased research, 
  
 24 Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development 
(R&D): A Discussion on the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act, in PATENTS: ISSUES AND 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 61, 64-65 (John V. Martin ed., 2002). 
 25 See Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21; see also Department of Health and Human 
Services, National Institutes of Health, NIH Response to the Conference Report Request for a Plan 
to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests are Protected (July 2001), http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm 
[hereinafter NIH Response] (stating the Bayh-Dole Act was passed “in response to concerns about 
U.S. competitiveness in the global economy”). Congress stated: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the 
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to 
encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research 
and development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by 
nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United 
States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government 
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize 
the costs of administering policies in this area. 
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
 26 Schacht, supra note 24, at 64; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200. 
 27 Schacht, supra note 24, at 64-65. 
 28 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211. 
 29 Id.; see also Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 30 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211; see also Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 31 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211; see also Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for “license”) (an exclusive 
license “gives the licensee the sole right to perform the licensed act . . . , and that prohibits the 
licensor . . . from granting the right to anyone else”). 
 33 Malinowski, supra note 1, at 54. 
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collegiality, and a regard for academic responsibilities such as teaching.34 
However, many universities have since overcome these concerns and 
have begun amassing large numbers of patents.35 Technology transfer, 
which is the process by which research results are transferred for sale in 
the public marketplace,36 is now an everyday part of research at 
universities. For example, one survey of university-owned patents 
reported that about 70% of the patents had been licensed at least one 
time.37 Some universities have gone even further and are engaging in 
research collaborations with industry, such as the plant and microbial 
research deal between the University of California, Berkeley and the 
pharmaceutical company Norvartis.38 Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act is 
viewed by many as succeeding in its goal of increasing the amount of 
research available in the marketplace.39 As a result, it clearly has played a 
key role in the commercialization of science. 
B. The Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter 
In addition to changes in the ownership structure of intellectual 
property rights arising out of scientific research, the scope of patentable 
subject matter has also grown. In 1952, Congress amended the patent law 
to include “new and useful process[es].”40 These amendments expanded 
patentable subject matter to include many diagnostic and treatment 
procedures that were not previously patentable, such as specific methods 
for cataract surgery.41 
  
 34 Id. at 54-55. Interestingly, similar concerns exist today. See infra Part II.A; see also 
Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 13-17. 
 35 Andrew Delbanco, Academic Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 
25. For example, in 2006 the University of California received 410 patents and M.I.T. received 139 
patents. Id.; see also Malinowski, supra note 1, at 54. However, the NIH has observed that “most 
university technology transfer programs have very few, if any, products in the market” and “operate 
their technology transfer programs at a loss.” NIH Response, supra note 25. 
 36 Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21 (Technology transfer is “the transfer of research 
results from universities to the commercial marketplace for the public benefit.”). 
 37 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF 
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 117 (Stephan A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza, eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL]. 
 38 Andrew Lawler, Last of the Big-Time Spenders?, 299 SCIENCE 330, 330 (2003). 
 39 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 2 (1998), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/ 
data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/15/9a/9c.pdf (“[University officials] said the act 
was having a positive impact and was working as the Congress intended.”); Guide to Bayh-Dole, 
supra note 21 (explaining that the Bayh-Dole Act has “fostered the commercialization of many new 
technological advances that impact the lives of millions of people across the nation”). 
 40 35 U.S.C. §101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent . . . .”); see also COLL. OF AM. PATHOLOGISTS, STATEMENT TO THE SECRETARY’S 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND SOCIETY (SACGHS) 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/statline/pdf/sacghs_comments.pdf [hereinafter AM. PATHOLOGISTS 
STATEMENT]. 
 41 AM. PATHOLOGISTS STATEMENT, supra note 40, at 6. 
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The courts have broadly construed these amendments. In a case 
in 1980, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,42 the Supreme Court held that “a live, 
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter.”43 The Court 
stressed that Congress’s intent in passing the amendments was to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”44 Although “laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” remained not 
patentable subject matter,45 the Chakrabarty decision is referenced as 
support for an expanding array of biotechnology patents, including 
patents on hybrid corn seeds and plants.46 
Chakrabarty is also referenced as support for patents on full or 
partial genes.47 In 1992, the National Institutes of Health filed 
applications for patents on 2300 partial genes.48 At the time, many 
members of the scientific and legal community were surprised that these 
patents were granted.49 However, by 2001, the patent office had firmly 
adopted the position that genes are patentable subject matter.50 The patent 
office consistently rejected the argument that genes were not patentable 
because they were products of nature.51 According to the patent office, 
the patent is for “the genetic composition isolated from its natural state 
and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other 
  
 42 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 43 Id. at 305. In Chakrabarty, the patentee had genetically engineered a bacterium that 
could break down crude oil, a property that was not possessed by any known naturally-occurring 
bacteria. Id. The Patent Office rejected the patent application because “as living things they are not 
patentable subject matter.” Id. at 306. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stressing the 
difference between the patentee’s non-naturally occurring organism and “a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon,” which the court stated would not be patentable. Id. at 309. This decision has been met 
with some criticism. See, e.g., Mark O. Hatfield, From Microbe to Man, 1 ANIMAL L. 5, 6 (1995) 
(“In each session of Congress since 1987, I have introduced legislation to place a moratorium on 
allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to issue patents on living organisms.”). 
 44 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 
1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 45 Id. 
 46 E.g., J. E. M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127, 129-
31 (2001). 
 47 See Michele Westhoff, Gene Patents: Ethical Dilemmas and Possible Solutions, 
HEALTH LAW., April 2008, at 1, 7; see, e.g., Christopher Jackson, Learning from the Mistakes of the 
Past: Disclosure of Financial Conflicts of Interest and Genetic Research, 11 RICH J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 
38-45 (2004), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v11i1/article4.pdf. But see Lori Andrews 
et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395, 1396 (2006) (stating Chakrabarty is 
“[o]ften mischaracterized as opening the door for patents claiming isolated and purified versions of 
naturally occurring products, including human genetic material . . .”); Westhoff, supra, at 7 (“Upon 
close examination, it seems that the [Chakrabarty] opinion’s own language forecloses the possibility 
that genes are patentable subject matter.”). 
 48 Hatfield, supra note 43, at 6. 
 49 Id. 
 50 In 2001, the patent office issued regulations requiring applicants for gene patents to 
show a use that is substantial. U.S. Issues Stiffer Regulations on Frivolous Patenting of Genes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001, at C3. Those regulations were viewed as firmly establishing the ability to patent 
genes or even portions of genes. Id.; see also 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-93 (Jan. 5, 2001). In fact, as 
early as 1998, this was the patent office’s position. See e.g., John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 
SCIENCE 689, 689 (1998). 
 51 See, e.g., 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
2009] BALANCING THE INTERESTS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 1479 
molecules naturally associated with it.”52 Therefore, genes can be 
patented if the inventor meets the general requirements of a patent.53 
The expansion of the subject matter of patents has also increased 
the number and types of patents that may result from scientific research. 
For example, patents are now available for diagnostic and treatment 
processes such as specific methods for cataract surgery,54 human-
engineered organisms such as human-made bacteria that breaks down 
oil55 and hybrid corn seed and plants,56 and even genes.57 Many people 
view these patents as a necessary incentive for research because they 
believe that patent rights encourage investment in research, the 
disclosure of research results, and the development of useful products.58 
Thus, the expanded scope of patentable subject matter, in addition to the 
transfer of patent titles to the research organizations, has led to an 
increase in scientific researchers receiving direct profits from their 
research. Yet as Congress and the courts have expanded the commercial 
  
 52 Id. Recently, the idea that a single gene can be related to a function has been put into 
question, thus raising even more questions about the validity of gene patents. Denise Caruso, A 
Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 3, at 3. 
Additionally, a lawsuit was recently filed challenging the patents that cover genes linked to breast 
cancer. See Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 
No. 08cv4515 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009). Indeed, legislation has even been introduced in Congress to 
prohibit the patenting of genes. See Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at 
A23; see also Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007). However, 
since gene patents are provided as an example of the way these controversies are expressed, this 
paper proceeds with the assumption that the patent office will continue issuing gene patents. 
 53 Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Essay, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics 
Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 403, 404 (2005). These 
requirements include a “sufficient written description,” utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. Id.; see 
also 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-05 (2000). The written description requires a description of the invention, the 
process for making the invention, and the process for using the invention. ALAN L. DURHAM, 
PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 85 (2d ed. 2004). Utility requires that the invention is useful to some 
extent, so long as the useful purpose is legal. Id. at 70-71. Finally, novelty requires that the invention 
is unique from previous inventions, id. at 90, while nonobviousness requires that the invention adds 
something to previous inventions that would not have occurred to the person of ordinary skill in the 
specific field of the invention, id. at 107. For a more thorough discussion of the requirements for a 
patent, see generally id. at 67-126. 
 54 See AM. PATHOLOGISTS STATEMENT, supra note 40, at 6. 
 55 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 56 See J. E. M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001). 
 57 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
 58 For example, with regards to the need for gene patents, John J. Doll, the director of the 
Biotechnology Examination Technology Center of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, has 
explained: 
Without the incentive of patents, there would be less investment in DNA research, and 
scientists might not disclose their new DNA products to the public. Issuance of patents to 
such products not only results in the dissemination of technological information to the 
scientific community for use as a basis for further research but also stimulates investment 
in the research, development, and commercialization of new biologics. It is only with the 
patenting of DNA technology that some companies, particularly small ones, can raise 
sufficient venture capital to bring beneficial products to the marketplace or fund further 
research. 
Doll, supra note 50, at 690. 
1480 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4  
nature of scientific research, they have failed to resolve the multitude of 
issues raised as a result of this commercial expansion. 
II. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SCIENCE 
Many people in varying fields have criticized the increasing 
commercialization of science.59 Indeed, the arguments against gene 
patents are typical examples of the arguments against the trend toward 
the commercialization of research.60 Additionally, the case of Greenberg 
v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc. provides an 
example of how these critiques can lead to conflicts between tissue 
donors and researchers.61 Greenberg suggests that since the 
commercialization of science is controversial, tissue donors need to be 
made aware of any proprietary uses of their donation in advance so that 
they can negotiate with the researcher if they oppose these commercial 
uses.62 
A. General Objections 
Many of the initial concerns expressed in the wake of the Bayh-
Dole Act continue to linger.63 These initial concerns included the fear 
that exclusive licenses could lead to high prices and monopolies.64 Since 
the patent owner could license the use of the patent to only one entity, 
many people were concerned taxpayers would be harmed because the 
entity receiving an exclusive license would have no competition and 
could charge high prices for a product that was developed as a result of 
publicly-funded research.65 Additionally, people were also concerned the 
act might unjustifiably benefit foreign industry, which could license the 
patents despite not contributing any resources towards the development 
of the patent.66 Finally, there were concerns that the involvement of non-
profit academic universities with for-profit corporate entities would harm 
academic institutions by altering the areas of faculty research, abolishing 
collegiality, and encouraging researchers to ignore their other academic 
  
 59 Certainly not everyone thinks that the commercialization of science is a bad thing. See, 
e.g., Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21 (“On a nation-wide basis, the results support the conclusion 
that the Bayh-Dole Act has promoted a substantial increase in technology transfer from universities 
to industry, and ultimately to the public.”). However, in order to understand why donors may be 
concerned about the potential uses of their donations, one must understand the objections donors 
may have to the commercialization of science. Thus, only the objections are addressed in this Note. 
 60 See infra Part II.B. 
 61 In Greenberg, this conflict arose when the tissue donors expected the research to 
remain in the public domain, but the researcher patented the research results. Greenberg v. Miami 
Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 62 See infra Part IV.C. 
 63 See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 13-17; Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 64 Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
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responsibilities, such as teaching.67 The concern that the act might 
unjustifiably benefit foreign industry is the only concern that seems to 
have completely dropped out of the debate. 
Indeed, just like the initial concerns expressed in the wake of 
Bayh-Dole, a substantial number of current concerns involve the changes 
to the research process and the academic community.68 Specifically, 
because of technology transfer—the transfer of research results into 
products in the marketplace69—research materials and information are no 
longer being openly shared among academic institutions.70 This can be 
particularly damaging when any single institution lacks the materials to 
do appropriate research on a given issue.71 For example, institutions 
researching autism do not have a sufficient number of tissue samples to 
identify the gene responsible for the disease, yet researchers do not share 
their tissue samples because each researcher wants to be the one to 
discover the gene and patent it.72 Furthermore, when sharing does occur, 
it can be done in such a way so as to discriminate against the non-sharing 
organizations.73 For example, the leading semiconductor companies swap 
and shuffle licenses in a way that effectively keeps their potential 
competitors out of the industry.74 
The effects of the commercialization of science on the progress 
of scientific knowledge also raise concerns.75 The broad reach of patent 
rights76 makes building upon others’ research increasingly more 
difficult.77 At best, this situation requires that researchers devote more of 
their budgets to licenses.78 At worst, researchers are outright prevented 
  
 67 Malinowski, supra note 1, at 54-55 (stating a concern university researchers would 
“shirk[] their academic responsibilities”); Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 13-17; Guide to Bayh-
Dole, supra note 21. 
 68 See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 6 (suggesting the connection between universities and 
industry threatens academic freedom). 
 69 Guide to Bayh-Dole, supra note 21. 
 70 See Malinowski, supra note 1, at 55; Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 13. In fact, the 
Bayh-Dole Act specifically is criticized for “increas[ing] the number and creativity of financial 
arrangements that give rise to conflicts of interest.” Gatter, supra note 6, at 619. 
 71 See Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 
23 (2005) [hereinafter Andrews, Benefits of Biobanks]. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Amy Harmon, In the “Idea Wars,” a Fight to Control a New Currency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Malinowski, supra note 1, at 55 (“[T]here is concern that over-patenting in 
biotechnology will result in license entanglements that will impede the advancement of research in 
the years to come, and impede medicinal applications with life and death consequences.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 76 See supra Part I.B. 
 77 See Harmon, supra note 73; see also Andrews et al., supra note 47, at 1395. 
 78 See, e.g., supra Part II.B. This raises concerns that these costs will be passed on to 
consumers. Due to concerns about the cost of access to therapeutic drugs, Congress asked the 
National Institutes of Health to prepare a plan to ensure the protection of the public’s interests. NIH 
Response, supra note 25 (plan prepared to ensure the public’s access to therapeutic drugs). 
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from doing the research.79 Additionally, many difficulties can arise 
between these two extremes.80 
A 2006 report by the National Research Council of the National 
Academies, an organization that provides public policy advice on issues 
concerning science, technology, and health policies,81 found that in 
general, patents have not yet significantly slowed or blocked research.82 
However, the report attributed this to a general lack of awareness among 
the research community regarding existing intellectual property rights.83 
It went on to warn that the lack of an effect on research could change 
dramatically if the research community becomes aware of its potential 
liability, particularly if patent holders begin to more actively exercise 
their patent rights.84 Thus, although the commercialization of science has 
not yet significantly slowed the progress of scientific knowledge, it is 
conceivable that even one successful patent liability suit could 
significantly alter the effect that patents have on research. 
Finally, the commercialization of science has also led to an 
increase in financial conflicts of interests.85 People that criticize these 
conflicts claim they threaten the integrity of the research.86 Specifically, 
  
 79 Andrews et al., supra note 47, at 1395. Patent holders can refuse to give other 
researchers a license to use the patented material. Id. Alternatively, the patent holder may require an 
excessive fee for the license. Id. 
 80 For example, DuPont’s license terms for its genetically engineered mice required 
researchers licensing the mice to obtain permission from DuPont before new discoveries were 
disclosed or used in commercial applications. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 
(1998). While some researchers accepted these restrictive terms and licensed the mice for use in their 
research, others rejected the terms, thus refusing to license the mice. Id. 
 81 The National Research Council, Welcome to the National Research Council, 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/nrc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
 82 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 125. While the National Research 
Council’s report focused on genetic research, similar findings have also been reported in the 
biomedical field. See generally John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of 
Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen 
& Stephen A. Merrill, eds. 2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10770.html (discussing 
the recent changes in patenting practices and affects of these changes in biotechnology). 
 83 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 125. Indeed, many researchers 
believed they did not need access to others’ patent rights in order to do their research. Id. at 122. 
Additionally, few researchers reported searching to see if any patents may affect their research, 
despite universities increasingly notifying researchers that they should be doing such searches. Id. 
 84 Id. at 125. This is particularly an issue since Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 
(2002), in which the Federal Circuit made clear that in most instances universities are not protected 
from patent infringement suits by the common-law research exemption. Id. at 1362 (“Similarly, our 
precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate 
business, regardless of commercial implications. For example, major research universities, such as 
Duke, often sanction and fund research projects . . . [that] unmistakably further the institution’s 
legitimate business objectives . . . .”). 
 85 See Malinowski, supra note 1, at 55; Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 15-16. 
 86 Malinowski, supra note 1, at 55 (stating that increases in financial conflicts of interest 
“jeopardize[] the integrity of research and the protection of human subjects”); see also Harmon, 
supra note 73 (stating critics complain that “intellectual property rights are regularly trumping social 
values like free speech or public health”). Indeed, even the scientific community itself recognizes the 
potential harm resulting from financial conflicts of interest, as many scientific journals require the 
 
2009] BALANCING THE INTERESTS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 1483 
critics have observed a tendency for studies’ outcomes to be favorable 
towards the researcher’s, or research sponsor’s, financial interests.87 For 
example, a review of studies on calcium-channel antagonists, a 
compound used to treat cardiovascular disease, showed that 96% of the 
authors of studies supporting the use of the compound for treatment had 
financial ties with a manufacturer of the compound.88 In contrast, only 
60% of authors of neutral studies and 37% of authors of negative studies 
had financial ties with a manufacturer of the compound.89 Financial 
conflicts of interest also raise the concern that researchers will forgo 
socially beneficial research that is not immediately profitable.90 These 
critiques can be particularly harmful when directed at academic research, 
which is research performed at non-profit universities, because it 
undercuts the researchers’ ability to evaluate hypotheses without any 
bias, including any financial bias.91 This ability is viewed as necessary to 
the integrity of academic research.92 
Thus, despite the government’s endorsement of the 
commercialization of science through the Bayh-Dole Act and the 
expansion of patentable subject matter,93 many people are still concerned 
about and criticize these changes. In fact, some scientists sympathetic to 
those concerns have taken efforts to keep their work in the public 
domain.94 Thus, tissue donors who object to the use of their tissue for 
  
disclosure of these conflicts in order for research to be published. See Richard M. Lebovitz, The 
Duty to Disclose Patent Rights, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 36, 36-37 (2007), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v6/n1/2/. 
 87 Petersen, supra note 6; Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 15-16. Sheldon Krimsky calls 
this phenomenon the “funding effect.” Petersen, supra note 6. 
 88 Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium-Channel 
Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101, 103 (1998). 
 89 Id. at 103. 
 90 See Charles Austin, Churches Examine Genetic Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1982, 
§ 1, at 39. 
 91 See Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and its Implications for the 
Judiciary, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 43, 51 (2005) (stressing the importance of evaluating research results 
without any bias); Lawler, supra note 38, at 332 (stating a report on the University of California, 
Berkeley’s collaboration with a large pharmaceutical company reported the deal “was a smashing 
success” and “that the university’s academic soul was never for sale” but that critics of the report 
called it too narrow and self-serving); Delbanco, supra note 35 (criticizing the modern university for 
becoming too much like corporations). 
 92 See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 6 (Sheldon Krimsky “argues that the lure of profits is 
transforming universities so that they are no longer independent, disinterested centers of learning 
that the public has long depended on.”). 
 93 See supra Part I. 
 94 For example, over 26,000 scientists vowed to boycott scientific journals that refused to 
place articles on a free on-line archive six months after publication. Harmon, supra note 73. The 
scientists, which included Nobel laureates, reasoned that the efforts of scientific journals “to control 
distribution of articles based on taxpayer-supported research [were] delaying scientific progress.” Id. 
Other groups have developed open-source science initiatives, which seek to keep research results in 
the public domain. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Open-Source Practices for Biotechnology, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at C8 [hereinafter Pollack, Open-Source Practices] (describing the Biological 
Innovation for Open Society, or BIOS, initiative); Science Commons Homepage, 
http://sciencecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Science Commons] (“Science 
Commons designs strategies and tools for faster, more efficient web-enabled scientific research. We 
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research ultimately used for commercial purposes could limit their 
donations to research in the public domain if they were aware of the 
researcher’s intentions. Indeed, the reasons why a donor may wish to do 
so become even more evidence when gene patents are considered, as this 
area is particularly controversial. 
B. Objections as Applied to Gene Patents 
Gene patents in particular exemplify the adverse effects of the 
commercialization of science.95 Gene patents are patents that cover the 
molecular structure of a portion of the genetic code and that structure’s 
known function.96 These patents are relevant to tissue donors because the 
research that underlies the patent application is done on donated tissues.97 
Critics raise many objections to gene patents. First, critics argue 
that genes are not patentable subject matter at all.98 Notably, these critics 
argue that genes should not be patented because they are products of 
nature that occur without human manipulation.99 Similarly, these patents 
have been criticized because the useful properties of genes are natural 
properties of the gene.100 In other words, the scientist has not invented the 
useful properties of a gene.101 
Second, gene patents are criticized because they lead to 
unreasonable healthcare costs.102 For example, the American College of 
Medical Genetics has expressed concerns that gene patents limit the 
  
identify unnecessary barriers to research, craft policy guidelines and legal agreements to lower those 
barriers, and develop technology to make research, data and materials easier to find and use. Our 
goal is to speed the translation of data into discovery—unlocking the value of research so more 
people can benefit from the work scientists are doing.”). In other words, these groups try to keep 
research results freely available to the public. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (8th ed. 2004) 
(entry for “public domain”) (defining the public domain as “[t]he universe of inventions and creative 
works that are not protected by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to 
use without charge”). Regardless of the method chosen, these groups are sending a clear message 
that they believe science will be best advanced if knowledge remains in the public domain rather 
than becoming commercialized by being sold for profit. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 73; Pollack, 
Open-Source Practices, supra; Science Commons, supra. 
 95 Although the patent office has issued gene patents for some time now, objections are 
still made. For a more extensive survey of these issues, see generally Andrews & Paradise, supra 
note 53. Additionally, the regulations that the USPTO has put in place to evaluate gene patents 
provide an excellent review of the arguments made against gene patents and the USPTO’s response 
to those arguments. See generally 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 96 See id. at 1095; see also Andrews & Paradise, supra note 53, at 405. 
 97 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 53, at 409. 
 98 See, e.g., id. at 403; Lindsey Singeo, Note, The Patentability of the Native Hawaiian 
Genome, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 124-25 (2007); Crichton, supra note 52; American College of 
Medical Genetics, Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing (Aug. 2, 
1999), http://www.acmg.net/StaticContent/StaticPages/Gene_Patents.pdf [hereinafter ACMG 
Position Statement]. 
 99 Westhoff, supra note 47, at 7-8; ACMG Position Statement, supra note 98. 
 100 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 53, at 405. 
 101 Id. 
 102 These costs can both be in terms of medical expenses and in terms of the prevention of 
the creation of improved health care techniques. See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 232-36. 
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accessibility of genetic tests, the quality of genetic tests available, and 
the number of medical professionals adequately trained to diagnose and 
properly care for genetic diseases.103 These concerns are not unfounded. 
In a study evaluating the effects of patents on genetic testing services, 
researchers found that 25% of the laboratories had stopped performing a 
specific genetic test because of a patent, and 53% of the laboratories had 
decided not to develop a new genetic test for the same reason.104 Thus, 
the costs of gene patents have reduced the availability of useful genetic 
tests to patients.105 In fact, biotechnology companies themselves have 
even expressed concerns about the ramifications of gene patents for 
healthcare costs.106 
A third objection is that gene patents hinder research.107 The 
American College of Medical Genetics argues that enforcement of 
genetic patents has led to either exclusive licenses that limit testing of a 
gene to a single laboratory or non-exclusive licenses with excessive 
fees.108 These licensing agreements can effectively halt research by 
making it too expensive to study.109 Research can also be halted when 
patent holders refuse to license the gene to other researchers.110 For 
example, one researcher abandoned a research project on women with 
early-stage breast cancer after the company owning the patents to two of 
the genetic mutations that cause breast cancer refused to license the tests 
necessary for the research.111 
  
 103 ACMG Position Statement, supra note 98; see also Malinowski, supra note 1, at 61 
n.123 (“[S]ome commentators are asserting that intellectual property rights . . . are impeding access 
to resulting genetic tests for medical use . . . .”); Crichton, supra note 52 (arguing countries without 
gene patents offer better genetic testing). 
 104 Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. OF MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 3 (2003), available at 
http://jmd.amjpathol.org/cgi/content/full/5/1/3. The researchers noted that almost all laboratory 
directors felt the patents negatively effect clinical testing. Id. 
 105 Id. at 8. 
 106 E.g., Andrew Pollack, Is Everything for Sale?: Patenting a Human Gene As if It Were 
an Invention, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Pollack, Patenting a Human Gene] (“Dr. 
Robert I. Levy, senior vice president for science and technology at American Home Products, calls 
the gene patenting situations a ‘minefield.’ Finding out who owns rights to what takes an increasing 
amount of time . . . . Royalties paid to holders of patents on genes, research mice and other tools can 
total 12 to 14 percent of the cost of a drug, he said, making some products uneconomical to 
produce.”). 
 107 See, e.g., ACMG Position Statement, supra note 98. 
 108 Id. (stating gene patents have led to “monopolistic licensing that limits a given genetic 
test to a single laboratory, royalty-based licensing agreements with exorbitant up-front fees and per-
test fees, [or] licensing agreements that seek proportions of reimbursement from testing services”). 
 109 See Crichton, supra note 52. Crichton observes that the cost of the genetic sequence 
for Hepatitis C has encouraged many researchers to study topics that cost less. Id. 
 110 Andrews, Benefits of Biobanks, supra note 71, at 26. 
 111 Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover Exploiting the US Patent System, A Single 
Company Has Gained Control Over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer. And 
Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to Play By its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2002, 
Magazine, at 10. The researcher could have sent in samples to the company for testing, but elected 
not to because he prefers his own test, which would provide him with greater information than the 
results provided by the company. Id.  
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Finally, many people object to gene patents on moral grounds.112 
In 1995, religious leaders of over eighty faiths and denominations held a 
press conference expressing their view that since genes are a part of 
nature, they should not be patented.113 Although the precise nature of the 
objections varied by faith, the religions opposed to gene patents include 
Methodists,114 Southern Baptists,115 Episcopalians,116 Muslims,117 and 
Reform Jews.118 The common theme among these objections is that gene 
patents involve “the commodification of life” because they place a 
commercial value on human life and reduce life to a marketable 
product.119 Similarly, others have expressed the general view that genes 
should remain a part of our shared knowledge base.120 Thus, people 
object to gene patents for several reasons. Given the myriad of issues a 
potential donor could have with gene patents, donors need some 
  
 112 E.g., Westhoff, supra note 47, at 8-9. These concerns also raise ethical issues when 
indigent and other vulnerable groups are involved. See Marina L. Whelan, Note, What, if Any, Are 
the Ethical Obligations of the U.S. Patent Office?: A Closer Look at the Biological Sampling of 
Indigenous Groups, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0014, ¶ 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006DLTR0014.pdf. Researchers frequently fail 
to consider the effect their research may have on these groups. Id. ¶ 10. In particular, researchers 
often fail to take into account indigenous groups’ belief that biological tissues are sacred and attempt 
to patent the genes they discover. Id. ¶ 10, 22. In one case, a Guayami woman’s tissue was used to 
develop a patented cell line without the permission of the woman or the tribe. Id. ¶ 13. This 
provoked protests from numerous groups, including the President of the Guayami General Congress 
and the Rural Advancement Foundation International. Id. ¶ 14. Ultimately the patent application was 
withdrawn. Id. These situations cause tension between researchers and critics, who argue that the 
researchers are exploiting the indigenous and other vulnerable groups. Id. ¶ 10. These critics are also 
concerned that the USPTO does not have the resources to deal with these issues. See Hatfield, supra 
note 43, at 6. 
 113 Richard Stone, Religious Leaders Oppose Patenting Genes and Animals, 268 SCIENCE 
1126, 1126 (1995). This viewpoint is not necessarily linked to any one religion, but rather is also a 
general moral argument that some critics make. See, e.g., Pollack, Patenting a Human Gene, supra 
note 106. 
 114 The Methodist Church created a genetic task force which in 1992 “concluded that 
‘exclusive ownership rights of genes as a means of making genetic technologies accessible raises 
serious theological concerns.’” Stone, supra note 113, at 1126. 
 115 The Executive Director of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Christian Life 
Commission stated that “granting patents on genes or organisms ‘represents the usurpation of the 
ownership rights of the Sovereign of the universe.’” Id. 
 116 A former Episcopal minister stated that companies should not be able to make profits 
off our “common human heritage.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117 The Executive Director of the American Muslim Counsel stated “[t]he engineering of 
humans and human genes raises serious concerns for Muslims.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 118 A Rabbi associated with the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism recognized 
that while “Jewish tradition has always stressed a reconciliation of religion and science,” the 
patenting process of human genes and living organisms was not necessary for a healthy 
biotechnology industry. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119 See, e.g., id. Stone defines the “commodification of life” as “the reduction of life to its 
commercial value and marketability.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120 E.g., Stifling or Stimulating—The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic 
Testing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Lawrence Sung, J.D., Ph.D., Law School 
Professor and Intellectual Property Law Program Director, University of Maryland, School of Law, 
Baltimore, MD) (“[G]enes are simply something that we have a sense should be part of the public 
common.”).  
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mechanism to provide them with a choice whether their tissue will be 
used for commercial purposes. 
C. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: An Example of How 
Donors’ and Researchers’ Interests May Conflict 
The opposing viewpoints regarding the commercialization of 
scientific research resulted in a conflict between donors and a researcher 
in Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc.121 In 
this case, a group of nonprofit organizations and individuals donated 
money, tissue samples, and other materials to a researcher in the hopes 
that he would discover the gene responsible for Canavan’s disease,122 a 
genetic disease that primarily affects Jewish children.123 The nonprofit 
organizations and individuals expected that the ongoing research would 
remain in the public domain,124 where it would be freely available to 
other researchers.125 However, the researcher patented the gene 
responsible for Canavan’s disease and a screening test for the gene 
shortly after it was discovered.126 This meant that any other researcher 
that wanted to research the disease must first obtain a license from the 
patentee.127 As a result, the patent allowed the researcher to restrict 
research related to the gene or any of the gene’s mutations.128 
Once the nonprofit organizations and individuals learned about 
the patent, they brought suit, alleging, inter alia, lack of informed 
consent, conversion, and unjust enrichment.129 The court dismissed the 
lack of informed consent claim, concluding that such a duty would “chill 
medical research.”130 However, the court did not provide much evidence 
to support its claim that requiring researchers to disclose financial 
interests would chill research.131 Indeed, the Greenberg plaintiffs 
criticized this in their motion for reconsideration, stating that “[t]he 
Court’s conclusion that extending the duty of informed consent to 
  
 121 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 122 Id. at 1067. 
 123 Canavan’s disease “is a relatively rare, but always fatal, inherited, degenerative brain 
disorder that primarily affects children of eastern and central European Jewish . . . descent.” 
Canavan Foundation, What Is Canavan Disease?, http://www.canavanfoundation.org/canavan.php 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
 124 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
 125 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “public domain” as 
“[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected by intellectual-property rights 
and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge”). 
 126 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 1067-68. Plaintiffs also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, 
and misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. at 1066. However, these causes of action are not discussed 
in depth here because the vast majority of the literature has focused on the informed consent, 
conversion, and unjust enrichment claims. 
 130 Id. at 1070-71. 
 131 Id. at 1070. 
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include disclosure of financial interests ‘would chill medical research’ is 
an issue that demands factual development and expert testimony and 
which [we] can [establish] as demonstrably untrue.”132 
The court also dismissed the conversion claim, reasoning that the 
donors had no legally cognizable property interest in the donated 
tissue.133 The court rejected the donors’ argument that they had a property 
interest in their tissue samples because the biological tissues “were 
donations to research without any contemporaneous expectations of 
return of the body tissue and genetic samples.”134 Accordingly, the only 
claim to survive summary judgment was an unjust enrichment claim.135 
This claim was ultimately settled by the parties in a settlement that 
provided the researcher would continue collecting licensing royalties on 
genetic testing, but would permit other researchers to do research on the 
gene without collecting licensing royalties.136 
Despite the Greenberg court’s purported interest in furthering 
science, many legal analysts and scientists have concluded that the 
Greenberg result is detrimental to the advancement of scientific 
research.137 Most notably, the court cited the fear that enabling donors to 
have a say in what happens to their body parts after the donation 
occurred would give them too much “dead-hand control,”138 and that such 
continuing control by donors over the use of their donated tissues would 
ultimately stifle science.139 However, the Greenberg court failed to 
  
 132 Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum of Law for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing 
Count I of Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 5, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 
F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 02-22244-CIV-MORENO), 2004 WL 2247051. 
Additionally, the Greenberg opinion has been critiqued as “an internally inconsistent ruling that fails 
to provide donors or researchers much useful guidance.” Russell Korobkin, “No Compensation” or 
“Pro Compensation”: Moore v. Regents and Default Rules for Human Tissue Donations, 40 J. 
HEALTH L. 1, 11 (2007) [hereinafter Korobkin, Default Rules]. 
 133 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074-76. 
 134 Id. at 1074. 
 135 Id. at 1072-73, 1077. 
 136 Although the settlement was confidential, a press release stated that it “provides for 
continued royalty-based genetic testing by certain licensed laboratories and royalty-free research by 
institutions, doctors, and scientists searching for a cure.” Canavan Foundation, Joint Press Release 
(Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-03_miami.php. 
 137 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 10, at 336-37 (suggesting that the case may harm “the 
perceived trust between researcher and patient—a relationship of trust and confidence without which 
research collaborations would fail”); see also Hanes, supra note 12, at 412 (making a similar 
criticism of the Catalona case, discussed infra Part III.B, stating that it may “negatively affect tissue 
donation”). 
 138 In property law, the notion of dead-hand control refers generally to the notion that a 
decedent could continue to control the distribution of his or her wealth in such a manner that it 
would continue to control the behavior of living beneficiaries, and that certain types of dead-hand 
control should be restricted. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for “deadhand 
control”). Here, the court used the phrase to create an analogy between a decedent continued control 
over beneficiaries after death and a tissue donor’s continued control over the researcher’s conduct 
regarding the tissue sample after the donation has been made. See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 
1071. 
 139 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (stating “this extra duty would give rise to a type 
of dead-hand control that research subjects could hold because they would be able to dictate how 
medical research progresses”). 
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realize that the lack of donor control itself may in fact stifle science by 
reducing the number of people willing to donate their biological tissues 
to research.140 This makes Greenberg a particularly interesting backdrop 
for examining the possible effects of solutions attempting to balance the 
interests of both donors and researchers. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Greenberg demonstrates how the increasing commercialization 
of science can lead to conflicts between donors and researchers. Indeed, 
donors’ interests must be protected and balanced against both the 
researchers’ and the public’s interest in furthering science.141 However, 
the court’s analysis of the Greenberg claims—and the subsequent 
discussion following that decision—raises the question of whether the 
existing legal framework sufficiently balances these interests. In 
particular, the majority of scholarship has focused largely on unjust 
enrichment, enhanced property rights in donated tissues, and informed 
consent.142 The following presents some of the arguments made by 
scholars in favor of each of these doctrines and then analyzes the effect 
each doctrine would likely have on researchers and donors. 
A. Unjust Enrichment 
The unjust enrichment cause of action is particularly important 
since it was the sole cause of action to survive summary judgment in 
Greenberg.143 The court, applying Florida law, stated that the elements of 
unjust enrichment were, “(1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the 
defendant, who had knowledge of the benefit; (2) the defendant 
voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) under the 
circumstances it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without paying for it.”144 Since unjust enrichment is an equitable 
doctrine, damages will vary based on the facts of the individual case, but 
  
 140 After all, there are a number of reasons donors may object to the use of their tissues 
for commercial purposes. See infra Part II.A-B. If donors have no control over the use of their tissue, 
they may choose not to donate at all, thus reducing the number of tissue samples available for 
research. See Eric B. Chen, Who Owns the Property Rights to Your Genetic Material?, 13 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (2004); Whelan, supra note 112, ¶ 4. 
 141 See Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts, 2006 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 317, 359-60 (2006) (“That Congress wanted biotechnology to thrive cannot in 
contemporary terms be interpreted as granting the biotech industry immunity from judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
 142 Some scholars also select a combination of several models. See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 
10, at 338-44 (proposing a combination of a property interest and a liability rule); Baird, supra note 
10, at 347-48 (proposing a combination of the informed consent and benefit-sharing models). 
 143 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
 144 Id. at 1072. 
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in certain circumstances the disgorgement of profits acquired from the 
patenting of research may be a potential form of relief.145 
Despite the fact that some scholars find unjust enrichment claims 
and other liability theories desirable to protect donors whose tissues are 
used for commercial purposes because they are flexible and can thus 
cover numerous situations,146 these theories pose three key problems. 
First, these claims are exceptionally broad and provide no clear guidance 
for researchers wishing to avoid liability.147 Ironically, it is the broadness 
of unjust enrichment claims that makes the doctrine so desirable to some 
scholars.148 These scholars find the broadness appealing because it 
provides flexibility for achieving an appropriate balance between donors’ 
and researchers’ competing interests.149 Yet this broadness also results in 
a lack of certainty for both donors and researchers.150  
While technically researchers have no positive duty under 
existing law to inform tissue donors of any potential proprietary uses of 
the resulting research,151 the result of unjust enrichment actions like the 
one brought in Greenberg is the creation of a de facto informed consent 
requirement.152 In other words, it provides an equitable remedy where 
there are no complementary legal guidelines or framework. While these 
actions will likely result in researchers disclosing potential proprietary 
uses,153 the use of unjust enrichment claims means that researchers have 
no clear guidelines regarding what must be disclosed or the procedures 
  
 145 Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243-44 (D. Colo. 
2001). Researchers at the University of Colorado developed a reformulation technique for prenatal 
vitamins that they intended to freely release into the public domain. Id. at 1242. The researchers 
intended for Cyanamid to use their work to develop improved prenatal vitamins, but they also 
intended for other manufacturers of prenatal vitamins to use their work. Id. However, Cyanamid 
patented the technique by falsely claiming that it was a Cyanamid researcher who developed it. Id. In 
a preliminary ruling on the issue of damages, the court stated that in the context of a situation where 
“an inventor [is] deprived of his prerogative not to patent, or to refuse to allow another to patent, his 
inventions,” the disgorgement of profits is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 1242-44. It is possible that 
in a situation where tissue donors intend to keep the results of research on their tissues in the public 
domain, but the researcher patents those results, a court would similarly find that the disgorgement 
of profits is an appropriate remedy. 
 146 See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 237; Larry I. Palmer, Should Liability Play a 
Role in Social Control of Biobanks?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 70, 77 (2005). 
 147 See Gitter, supra note 10, at 337-38. 
 148 See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 237; Palmer, supra note 146, at 72. 
 149 E.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 237 (“Although not limitless, . . . examples of 
potential claims illustrate the far-reaching possibilities of the unjust enrichment claim to deter the 
practice of patenting human genetic material.”); Palmer, supra note 146, at 72 (noting the 
importance “of liability rules in arriving at the appropriate institutional balance between research 
goals and promises versus individual and group desires to have some degree of social control over 
the research enterprise”). 
 150 This vagueness has led one author to state that unjust enrichment claims are “too ad 
hoc . . . to be relied upon for future research participants.” Gitter, supra note 10, at 338. 
 151 See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 248-49. 
 152 See Korobkin, Default Rules, supra note 132, at 13. 
 153 See Palmer, supra note 146, at 72 (noting the purpose of a liability action is to 
encourage information disclosure). 
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necessary to accomplish disclosure.154 Rather, appropriate disclosure 
determinations can be made only after-the-fact.155 Although this 
flexibility can be attractive, as it allows for disclosure to vary with 
“changing social mores and attitudes,”156 it comes at the clear expense of 
researcher certainty. As a result, unjust enrichment claims do not 
adequately protect researchers’ interest in efficiency, as the researchers 
must determine what disclosures are appropriate.157 Additionally, unjust 
enrichment claims do not adequately protect donors’ interests in 
receiving the appropriate disclosures since there are no clear guidelines. 
Second, unjust enrichment claims require that donors discover 
that their tissues have been used for a commercial purpose.158 Although 
this issue poses a challenge to any plaintiff, it is particularly problematic 
in the case of unjust enrichment precisely because researchers do not 
have an affirmative or explicit duty to disclose any potential proprietary 
uses.159 If the researchers do not disclose this information, or if they 
disclose too little information, some donors may erroneously assume that 
the research will remain in the public domain.160 Thus, these donors will 
be at an even greater disadvantage than donors who make no 
assumptions that the research will remain in the public domain because 
they will not be aware of the possibility that their tissues will be used for 
profitable purposes. 
Finally, despite the flexibility of equitable relief, unjust 
enrichment claims may still not provide plaintiffs with the relief they 
desire. Although the disgorgement of profits is one potential form of 
relief,161 this remedy likely will be rarely granted. Since unjust 
enrichment is an equitable doctrine, courts may take into account 
whether it is just for the defendants to keep the profits.162 In making this 
determination, courts have suggested that disgorgement of profits is most 
  
 154 This contradictory position of the Greenberg court has been noted by scholars. See, 
e.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 227 (“The judge declined to extend a ‘duty of informed consent to 
the researcher’s economic interests’ and yet the lack of disclosure to the plaintiffs of the defendants’ 
intent to patent and profit from the research was considered unjust.”). 
 155 Palmer, supra note 146, at 77. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Alternatively, the researcher could disclose everything. However, this would be 
undesirable for the researcher because of the added expense it would create. Similarly, it would be 
undesirable for the donor because it could result in important information about significant conflicts 
of interest being buried by a substantial number of relatively small conflicts of interests that have 
little to no effect on the donor’s decision to donate. 
 158 See, e.g., Lori Andrews, The Battle Over the Body, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, at 22, 26 
[hereinafter Andrews, Battle Over the Body] (“[M]ost people whose tissue is mined for patentable 
genes do not even know they have been donors.”). 
 159 See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 248-49. 
 160 Although there will be donors that are neutral on this issue, there is reason to believe a 
significant amount of tissue donors, if made aware of the issue, would prefer to donate their tissue 
samples to research remaining in the public domain. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 161 E.g., Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243-44 (D. 
Colo. 2001); San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855-57 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 162 Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855-56. 
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appropriate where the defendant acted in a particularly culpable manner, 
such as when the defendant acts in conscious disregard of others’ 
rights.163 Additionally, monetary damages are inadequate for donors, such 
as the Greenberg plaintiffs, that are seeking to have the research results 
remain in the public domain.164 
Thus, unjust enrichment claims are appealing because they are 
broad and flexible.165 However, they also pose significant problems, as 
they fail to provide clear guidelines regarding what information must be 
disclosed.166 Furthermore, unjust enrichment claims will only protect 
donors that already are aware that their tissues may be used for profitable 
purposes.167 Finally, unjust enrichment claims may not provide adequate 
remedies for plaintiffs.168 
B. Property Interests and Conversion 
Another proposed way to protect donors’ interests is providing 
tissue donors with a property interest in their tissues.169 This property 
interest would grant tissue donors more control over their donations,170 
including enabling tissue donors to bring an action of conversion if their 
tissues are used for unauthorized uses.171 Proponents of a property 
interest argue that this is consistent with how people view their bodies, as 
people intuitively feel they own their bodies.172 These scholars also argue 
that a property interest is also consistent with the current trend to view 
genetic materials as property.173 For example, researchers increasingly 
  
 163 For example, in American Cyanamid, the court stressed the “extreme culpability” of 
the defendants in its decision to grant disgorgement of profits. 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. Similarly, in 
Walsh, the court reasoned that “a person acting in conscious disregard of the rights of another should 
be required to disgorge all profit.” 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856. 
 164 Baird, supra note 10, at 337. 
 165 See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. 
 166 See supra notes 146-157 and accompanying text. 
 167 See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text. 
 168 See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text. 
 169 See, e.g., Andrews, Battle Over the Body, supra note 158, at 24. 
 170 Baird, supra note 10, at 345; see also Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from 
Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 748 
(2004) (noting “property promises powerful protections”). 
 171 Conversion is “[t]he wrongful possession or disposition of another’s property as if it 
were one’s own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without lawful justification, with an 
item of property in a manner inconsistent with another’s right, whereby that other person is deprived 
of the use and possession of the property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (8th ed. 2004). In 
Greenberg, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for conversion because the donors lacked a 
property right in their tissues. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Thus, recognizing a property interest in their tissues may 
make these claims justiciable. Goodwin, supra note 141, at 371. 
 172 See, e.g., Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, § 6, at 
38. At the same time, a similar argument is made by opponents to property rights in biological 
tissues. See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 141, at 318 (arguing property rights are against “the 
established normative view of the body as a sacred, inalienable object”). 
 173 Suter, supra note 170, at 746. 
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view genetic materials and information as property because of potential 
patent property rights.174 
Finally, some scholars argue that recognizing a property interest 
in tissues is important because it may permit donors to sell their 
tissues.175 These scholars contend that the sale of tissue donations would 
ensure the tissues were used for the most efficient use.176 They also 
contend that it is only fair that the donor profits from the sale of their 
tissues because all of the other parties involved profit from the 
research.177 Thus, the argument that tissue donors should have a property 
interest and be able to sell their bodily tissues reflects the general 
movement towards the commercialization of scientific research in past 
years.178 
Although the granting of explicit property rights may appear to 
be a sufficient method to protect donors’ interests, it does not work for 
donors that generally object to the commercialization of science. For 
example, recognizing a property interest in a donor’s bodily tissues may 
be an uncomfortable form of protection for donors who object to the 
increasingly commercial nature of scientific research.179 In short, the 
granting of a property interest would increase the total number of market 
transactions by adding yet another party that may receive 
compensation.180 Additionally, granting a property interest in the donor’s 
bodily tissues invokes the same moral and religious objections that have 
been expressed with gene patents.181 Indeed, one of the primary 
arguments against granting donors with property rights in their biological 
tissues is that it commodifies, or commercializes, life.182 
Not all scholars who argue that property rights are necessary to 
protect donors agree that tissue donors should be allowed to sell their 
tissues.183 Scholars who argue for a property right that does not permit 
tissue donors to sell their tissues ground their arguments in the idea that 
  
 174 Id. at 745-46. 
 175 Gitter, supra note 10, at 262-63; Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-
Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 165 (2005). Similarly, benefit sharing has been 
proposed. Chen, supra note 140, at 10. This model provides for a licensing scheme where patients 
give up their personal property claims to their tissues in exchange for a small percentage of the 
commercial profits generated from the research results. Id. This model assumes that tissue donors 
must and do accept the commercialization of research. See, e.g., id. 
 176 Marchant, supra note 175, at 165. These scholars argue that the sale of tissues ensures 
that the bodily tissue goes to the researcher that values it the most. Id. However, this position 
assumes that the researcher that values the tissue the most will put it to the most efficient use. Id. 
 177 Id.; Suter, supra note 170, at 757. 
 178 Suter, supra note 170, at 745; see also supra Part I. 
 179 See supra Part II. 
 180 See supra Part II. 
 181 See Gitter, supra note 10, at 277; see also supra notes 112-120 and accompanying 
text. 
 182 See, e.g., Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls Our 
Genetic Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (2006) (stating property 
rights in biological tissues “disregard[] personhood values and interest in the self”). 
 183 See Suter, supra note 170, at 757. 
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the concept of property is flexible.184 Specifically, the commercialization 
of human tissue is not a necessary result of recognizing a property 
interest in bodily tissues.185 In other words, these scholars argue it is 
possible to provide for a property right that would allow for donors’ 
control over their tissues by providing for a conversion action without 
permitting donors to exert control over their tissues by selling them.186 
On its face, this suggestion appears to resolve any concerns 
donors may have about a property interest in biological tissues 
commodifying life and adding to the commercial interests of researchers. 
However, the ability to freely sell property, and thus commercialization, 
is the norm of property law, not the exception.187 Thus, even if donors 
were provided a property right without the ability to sell their tissues, 
concerns remain about the inherent market values associated with 
property rights.188 Since people associate market values with property 
rights, a property right will still have the effect of making people 
comfortable with viewing biological tissues as a commercial item.189 In 
other words, regardless of whether donors are permitted to sell their body 
tissues, recognizing a property right brings with it an assumption that 
those items that are property are most appropriately allocated through 
market mechanisms.190 Therefore, there is a significant risk that 
recognizing a property right in donors’ tissues, even if that right 
explicitly prevents donors from selling their tissues, may still commodify 
life.191 
On the other hand, even if courts were to recognize that donors 
have a property interest in their tissues,192 it may not provide donors 
  
 184 See Korobkin, Default Rules, supra note 132, at 4; Baird, supra note 10, at 345. 
 185 See Baird, supra note 10, at 345. 
 186 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 170, at 757. 
 187 Id. at 748. 
 188 See id. at 803 (“[A]llowing genetic information to be a commodity in some instances 
might drive us to think of it solely as a commodity.”); see also Goodwin, supra note 141, at 318 
(arguing that recognizing a property right in body tissues “would violate the established normative 
view of the body as a sacred, inalienable object”). 
 189 Id. 
 190 E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 9 (1996). E. Richard Gold explains that there are three aspects of this 
assumption: 
The first of these is that different objects are valuable to us, and ought to be distributed, 
according to different modes of valuation. The second component is that, whatever these 
different modes of valuation are, they can be translated into or thought of in terms of a 
market price. Third, the market will allocate the object in accordance with the most 
significant of these modes of valuation, using market price as a guide. 
Id. 
 191 See Gitter, supra note 10, at 312 (“[W]idespread societal acceptance of the notion that 
research participants possess a property interest in their tissue will lead individuals to expect 
compensation . . . .”). 
 192 In reality, this is rather unlikely, as current biotechnology jurisprudence has rejected 
the notion of the body as property. See Goodwin, supra note 141, at 319. It is much more likely that 
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much protection. As noted previously, donors may not be aware that 
their donations may be used for commercial purposes.193 Without being 
aware of this possible use of their tissues, many donors who might want 
to negotiate to ensure their tissues are not used for proprietary research 
will not realize that they need to do so.194 Thus, recognizing a property 
interest does not help donors that are unaware that the researcher may 
benefit financially from the research results,195 but who would object to 
this gain if asked. 
This is particularly evident in light of the decisions by the district 
court and the Eighth Circuit in Washington University v. Catalona.196 In 
Catalona, Washington University filed a declaratory action against a 
former researcher, Dr. Catalona, seeking a declaration of ownership over 
biological materials in a biorepository,197 which contains tissue sample 
donations from which DNA can be obtained for research.198 The donors 
and Dr. Catalona argued that Dr. Catalona should be granted possession 
of the biological materials.199 They reasoned the materials were donated 
with the “intent” that they would be used for Dr. Catalona’s research.200 
Additionally, the donors argued they “retained ownership rights in their 
donated biological materials and [could] withdraw said materials and 
have them transferred . . . via their discontinuation of participation in any 
research at [Washington University] and their signing of Dr. Catalona’s 
consent form.”201 
  
such an interest would be the result of legislation, which would be able to specify the nature of the 
interest and thus may provide more protection. 
 193 See Andrews, Battle Over the Body, supra note 158, at 26. 
 194 These donors could choose not to have their tissue donations used for proprietary uses 
for a number of reasons. For an overview of objections to the commercialization of science, see 
supra Part II. 
 195 Most donors will recognize that the researcher will benefit financially from the 
research in terms of the researcher’s salary from his or her employer. Similarly, many donors will 
also likely recognize that the researcher may receive indirect financial benefits if the research results 
are important to the research community. For example, a successful research project may increase 
the researcher’s reputation in the community or result in the researcher gaining tenure at an 
educational institution, both of which may ultimately result in a salary increase. However, the key 
concern for the purposes of this Note is that donors will not be aware of direct financial benefits the 
researcher may receive. These direct financial benefits include, for example, royalty fees received 
from licensing patents developed as a result of the research. 
 196 Washington Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona I), 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006), 
aff’d, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 197 Id. at 987. Dr. Catalona began gathering prostate cancer samples during his 
employment at Washington University. Skloot, supra note 172. Washington University obtained the 
samples years before the litigation arose. Id. However, when Dr. Catalona took a position at 
Northwestern University, he sent a letter to many of the donors in the biorepository with a release 
form instructing Washington University to release the samples upon the doctor’s request. Catalona I, 
437 F. Supp. 2d at 993. 
 198 Bregman-Eschet, supra note 182, at 8. These biorepositiories are also referred to as 
“DNA banks or biobanks.” Id. 
 199 Catalona I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994. Interestingly, Dr. Catalona abandoned the 
argument that he owned the materials. Id. at 994 n.11. 
 200 Id. at 994. 
 201 Id. 
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Ultimately, both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit 
determined that Washington University owned the tissues because the 
donors had made a valid inter vivos gift.202 Under Missouri law, 
Washington University “bear[ed] the burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence there was (1) present intent of the donor to make a 
gift, (2) delivery of the property by the donor to the donee, and (3) 
acceptance of the gift by the donee.”203 The courts found that Washington 
University met its burden in proving these elements,204 which are typical 
elements for an inter vivos gift.205 Importantly, the Eighth Circuit stated 
that the donors’ ability to withdraw from the study did not mean the 
transfer was not absolute.206 Rather, it recognized that a valid inter vivos 
gift may be made subject to the donor’s later exercise of an express 
revocation right.207 
Thus, Catalona demonstrates that in order for a property model 
to adequately protect donors’ interests, the donors must be aware that 
their tissues may be used for profit-creating purposes. Once aware, the 
donors could potentially negotiate with the researcher to ensure that their 
tissues were not used for certain uses.208 For example, they could 
  
 202 Id. at 997; Washington Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona II), 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 
2007). In other words, the donors made a valid gift during their lifetime. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
710 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for “inter vivos gift”). The District Court first applied Missouri property 
law to reach its conclusion that the university owned the tissues, noting “exclusive possession and 
control of personal property is prima facie evidence of ownership, and anyone else claiming such 
property bears the burden of proof.” Catalona I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994. Since Washington 
University met both of these criteria, the donors had the burden of proving their ownership interest. 
Id. Not surprisingly, the court determined that the donors had not met this burden. Id. at 997. The 
court reasoned: 
Both the Greenberg and the Moore cases found the research participant to be a “donor” 
who had parted with any semblance of ownership rights once their biological materials 
had been excised for medical research. Both courts reviewed relevant caselaw, addressed 
policy considerations, and addressed the implications of applicable federal and/or state 
laws dealing with biological materials. The Court finds their analysis to be persuasive, 
and in light of its own review of applicable Missouri law, finds that WU has met its 
burden in establishing ownership of the subject materials and that the RPs have not put 
forth adequate evidence to challenge WU’s ownership claim. 
Id. However, the Eighth Circuit never addressed this argument. It found that the university owned 
the tissues as a result of a valid inter vivos gift. Catalona II, 490 F.3d at 676. 
 203 Catalona II, 490 F.3d at 674. 
 204 Catalona I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994; Catalona II, 490 F.3d at 674-77. 
 205 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Property states: 
(a) To make a gift of property, the donor must transfer an ownership interest to the donee 
without consideration and with donative intent. 
(b) Acceptance by the donee is required for a gift to become complete. Acceptance is 
presumed, subject to the donee’s right to refuse or disclaim. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (2003). 
 206 Catalona II, 490 F.3d at 675. 
 207 Id. (stating “an inter vivos gift nevertheless may be subject to a condition allowing the 
donor to exercise a particular revocation right in the future”). 
 208 Although negotiation suggests contract, this condition also could be a permissible 
condition on the donation. See, e.g., id. 
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negotiate a provision that the tissues could not be used for commercial 
uses. However, without this negotiation, courts would likely follow the 
Catalona court’s lead and find that the donation was a valid and 
generally unrestricted inter vivos gift.209 This is because the Missouri law 
regarding inter vivos gifts is sufficiently similar to other inter vivos gift 
requirements that a court could analogize to the Catalona case.210 Since 
courts have been reluctant to grant donors control over their tissues,211 
subsequent courts would likely make this analogy and hold the donors 
made an inter vivos gift and thus do not retain control over the use of 
their donations. 
Finally, granting property interests in donated tissues is also 
harmful to the progress of research because it increases researchers’ 
transaction costs.212 For example, researchers would face the costs of 
negotiating donor compensation, including the time and effort required 
and the increased costs of a potential holdout requesting a very high 
compensation rate.213 This increase in transaction costs may also trickle 
down and harm society by slowing the progress of scientific 
knowledge.214 In particular, the increased costs to researchers may 
decrease investment in biotechnology research, and as a result slow 
important medical advancements.215 Thus, the property solution is 
inadequate because it poses significant burdens on the researcher and 
violates potential ethical and moral beliefs of the donor. 
C. Informed Consent 
Some scholars also suggest that informed consent might be used 
to protect donors.216 This doctrine, which was originally developed to 
protect research participants’ autonomy, or individual choice,217 requires 
mandatory disclosure by the researchers to the research participant—in 
this case, the tissue donor.218 Currently, both state and federal laws 
govern the disclosures the researcher must make in order to obtain 
  
 209 See, e.g., id. at 676. 
 210 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (2003). 
 211 See, e.g., Catalona II, 490 F.3d at 673-77; Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ., No. 04-CV-
1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL 6199562, at *4-*5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005); Greenberg v. Miami 
Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074-96 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Moore v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal. 1990). 
 212 Bregman-Eschet, supra note 182, at 25; Gitter, supra note 10, at 279. 
 213 Gitter, supra note 10, at 279-80. 
 214 Id. at 277. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See, e.g., Kevin L. J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent 
and the Protection of Tissue Sources’ Research Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 386 (2004). 
 217 Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605, 611 (2007) [hereinafter Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research]. 
 218 See id. at 610; Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 368-69. 
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informed consent.219 These required disclosures include an explanation of 
the research procedure, the potential risks, and the potential benefits.220 
Additionally, the federal regulations governing research involving 
humans,221 generally referred to as the Common Rule,222 also permit 
optional disclosures of information. Optional disclosures may occur 
when the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the institutional organization 
in charge of ensuring research is ethically acceptable,223 requires the 
disclosure of information in order to protect research participants’ 
rights.224 
Informed consent is an appealing solution for donors. The 
doctrine’s historical recognition of the importance of research 
participants’ autonomy225 nicely complements the idea that donors should 
have a choice regarding the proprietary use of their tissues. In addition, 
informed consent ensures that donors are aware their tissues may be used 
for profit-making purposes, such as gene patents, since this information 
would be disclosed.226 Furthermore, informed consent requirements also 
typically impose a relatively minor burden on researchers. Despite the 
Greenberg court’s conclusion that requiring researchers to disclose the 
potential commercial uses of science would have a devastating impact on 
science, few scholars have been able to identify these harmful effects.227 
  
 219 Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 611. This brief 
overview of informed consent focuses on informed consent in the nontherapeutic research situation. 
For a summary of informed consent law in both the treatment and research contexts, see generally 
Grimm, supra note 10. 
 220 More specifically, the Common Rule requires that researchers disclose: 
[T]he description, purpose, duration, and experimental nature of the study; any 
reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject; any reasonably expected 
benefits to the subject or to others; appropriate alternative procedures or treatments that 
might be advantageous to the subject; the extent of privacy and confidentiality of records 
identifying the subject; the availability of compensation or treatment for possible injuries; 
contact information in case the subject has questions or concerns; and the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 610. One author has suggested 
that the lack of an explicit requirement reflects the fact that scientific research has changed 
immensely since the Common Rule was created. See Andrews, Benefits of Biobanks, supra note 71, 
at 25. 
 221 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2006). 
 222 See Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 367. 
 223 Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941, 
953 (2006). 
 224 In particular, an “IRB may require that [other] information . . . be given to the subjects 
when . . . the information would meaningfully add to the protection of the rights and welfare of 
subjects.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. 
 225 See id. at 611. 
 226 Granted, informed consent forms are often criticized for being extremely long and 
difficult to understand. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 11, at 60-61; Gatter, supra note 6, at 614-15. 
However, disclosure of researchers’ financial interests in the informed consent form at least provides 
the information and increases the chances that the donor is aware of these potential uses. 
 227 One author went so far as to characterize the court’s conclusion as “inapt” and 
“backward.” Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 618. Even an 
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In fact, one scholar determined that the only potential harm that could 
occur from the disclosure of a researcher’s financial interests would be a 
reduction in the number of tissue donations.228 This could occur if a 
significant number of donors refused to donate their samples to 
researchers that would profit from them.229 However, granting donors 
with a degree of control over their tissue samples may actually open up a 
new source of donors for those researchers that do not intend to profit 
from their research.230 
Another burden imposed upon researchers by an informed 
consent requirement is that researchers would be required to develop a 
system to keep track of the donor’s wishes with regards to the sample’s 
use.231 Currently, researchers do not document any information regarding 
the donors’ intentions for the use of tissue samples.232 However, 
oftentimes other types of information about the donor, such as the 
donors’ health records, are stored with the tissues because this 
information is necessary for the planned research.233 As a result, although 
researchers may find it inconvenient to devise a system to track donors’ 
wishes, this requirement would pose a rather minimal burden on 
researchers in light of the fact that they already store other information 
about the donor with the tissue donations. Thus, informed consent 
permits donors to determine whether their tissue donations will be used 
for profit-making purposes without generally imposing a significant 
burden on researchers. 
However, informed consent is not a panacea as there are several 
problems with the current informed consent laws. Indeed, many scholars 
in favor of requiring disclosure of financial interests acknowledge 
  
author that agreed with the court’s dismissal of the informed consent claim recognized that requiring 
disclosure would place little burden on researchers. See Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 377-78. 
 228 See Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 618-19. 
 229 Id. Indeed, at least one court has refused to accept a decrease in participants as a 
justification for nondisclosure of information. Id. at 619 n.60. That court reasoned that promoting the 
progress of science by not informing a donor about an aspect of the research, such as the researcher’s 
financial interests, undermines the principle of autonomy that underlies informed consent. See, e.g., 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 844 (Md. 2001) (rejecting “[t]he fact that if 
such information was furnished, it might be difficult to obtain human subjects for the research” as a 
justification for nondisclosure of information); see also Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research, supra note 217, at 619. 
 230 See Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 618-19. As 
researchers continue to profit from research, donors will increasingly become aware that their tissues 
may be used for profitable research. Extending one study’s findings to the general public, about 1/3 
of potential donors opposes the use of their tissues for profitable research. See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. If those donors are unable to control whether their tissue is used for profitable 
research, they will most likely elect not to donate. E.g., Chen, supra note 140, at 9. However, if the 
donors can control whether their tissue is used for profitable research, they will still be able to donate 
their tissues to research that the researcher will not profit from. 
 231 See Skloot, supra note 172. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework 
for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 737, 739-41 (1999). 
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modifications to existing law are necessary since current laws do not 
require that donors consent to profitable uses of research.234 In fact, 
neither the current federal nor state informed consent laws require that 
researchers disclose any potential profit-making uses of the research 
results to donors.235 The federal Common Rule contains no explicit 
requirement that researchers disclose their financial interests.236 As a 
result, any financial disclosures would be optional under the provisions 
permitting the IRB to require additional disclosures.237 In addition, state 
common law actions for lack of informed consent do not clearly require 
financial disclosure.238 These actions typically only require disclosure of 
the material risks of physical harm to the research participant as a result 
of the participant’s involvement in the research.239 Common law actions 
for lack of informed consent do not typically cover the emotional or 
economic harms that would result from the non-disclosure of a 
researcher’s financial interests.240 
Thus, since neither set of regulations explicitly requires that 
researchers disclose their financial interests, current federal or state 
  
 234 E.g., Jackson, supra note 47, ¶¶ 38-45; Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 386-89. 
 235 See Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 366. 
 236 Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 610. In fact, some 
scholars argue that although the current case law virtually requires researchers to put such terms into 
their informed consent forms, there is a risk in doing so absent an explicit legal duty because they 
may violate the “no waiver” provision found in the Common Rule. Korobkin, Default Rules, supra 
note 132, at 13. This provision states that: 
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language 
through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any 
of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, 
the institution or its agents from liability for negligence. 
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2006). The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), the body 
responsible for offering guidance to research institutions regarding interpretation of the federal 
regulations, see OHRP Fact Sheet, Nov. 8, 2008, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ohrpfactsheet.htm, 
has interpreted the no waiver provision to mean that it would be improper for researchers to insert a 
clause in their informed consent forms that is too general. Office for Protection from Research Risks 
(OPRR), Cooperative Oncology Group Chairpersons Meeting, “Exculpatory Language” in Informed 
Consent (Nov. 15, 1996), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm [hereinafter 
Exculpatory Language]; see also Korobkin, Default Rules, supra note 132, at 13. However, these 
guidelines go on to say that specific language, such as, “Tissue obtained from you in this research 
may be used to establish a cell line that could be patented and licensed. There are no plans to provide 
financial compensation to you should this occur,” is permissible. Exculpatory Language, supra. 
However, permissible provisions, as opposed to required provisions, do not adequately protect 
donors’ interests. 
 237 See notes 222-224 and accompanying text. 
 238 In fact, the state common law doctrine of informed consent most likely does not 
require disclosure of financial interests. Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 366; see also Greenberg v. 
Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070-71 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(“declin[ing] to extend the duty of informed consent to cover a researcher’s economic interests”). 
 239 Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 379; see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 
782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001) (stressing the importance of protecting research participants from 
physical harm). This focus is likely due to the fact that informed consent originally developed as a 
cause of action in a therapeutic context, where the research participant directly benefits, and the 
general requirements reflect this. Grimm, supra note 10, at 57-58; Korobkin, Nontherapeutic 
Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 611. 
 240 Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 379. 
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regulations cannot be relied upon to ensure donors are aware of the 
potential profitable uses of the research.241 Without explicit disclosure 
requirements, researchers have demonstrated that they are reluctant to 
provide this information, and when they do it is often vaguely phrased.242 
For example, one informed consent form simply states, “You will receive 
no reimbursement for donating tissue,”243 without going on to explain the 
financial rewards that the researchers may receive. 
Moreover, even if the Common Rule did mandate disclosure of 
researchers’ financial interests as scholars have proposed,244 informed 
consent would still not adequately protect donors. This is because the 
federal Common Rule does not apply to all research.245 Specifically, 
Common Rule provisions govern research on humans only when the 
research is federally funded, or when the research institution has assured 
the federal government that the Common Rule requirements will be 
followed.246 The scope of the federal regulations is expanded by the U.S. 
  
 241 See Skloot, supra note 172. This is particularly interesting considering many 
professional organizations have passed guidelines requiring disclosure of the potential commercial 
uses of research. Andrews, Benefits of Biobanks, supra note 71, at 25. For example, the American 
Medical Association’s Code of Ethics provides: 
Physicians contemplating the commercial use of human tissue should abide by the 
following guidelines: (1) Informed consent must be obtained from patients for the use of 
organs or tissues in clinical research. (2) Potential commercial applications must be 
disclosed to the patient before a profit is realized on products developed from biological 
materials. (3) Human tissue and its products may not be used for commercial purposes 
without the informed consent of the patient who provided the original cellular material. 
(4) Profits from the commercial use of human tissue and its products may be shared with 
patients, in accordance with lawful contractual agreements. (5) The diagnostic and 
therapeutic alternatives offered to patients by their physicians should conform to 
standards of good medical practice and should not be influenced in any way by the 
commercial potential of the patient’s tissue. 
Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Ethics E-2.08 Commercial Use of Human Tissue, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter 
AMA Code of Ethics]. This suggests a general recognition that donors should be made aware of 
these uses. However, there are only guidelines, and as such, do not generally provide for a justiciable 
cause of action. See Skloot, supra note 172. 
 242 See Skloot, supra note 172. Rebecca Skloot gives several examples of current 
informed consent provisions: 
The norm is still a sentence or two saying leftover blood and tissue can be used for 
education and research. When it comes to profits, some consent forms come right out and 
say, “We may give or sell the specimen and certain medical information about you.” 
Others skip disclosure or say, “You will receive no reimbursement for donating tissue.” 
Still others admit confusion: “Your sample will be owned by [the university]. . . . It is 
unknown whether you will be able to gain (participate in) any financial compensation 
(payment) from any benefits gained from this research.” 
Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 See, e.g., Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 386. 
 245 Skloot, supra note 172 (observing that “[i]n the end, much of tissue research is not 
governed by the Common Rule”); see also Gatter, supra note 6, at 587. For an overview of the 
Common Rule’s requirements, see supra note 220. 
 246 Korobkin, Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, supra note 217, at 612. Notably, 
there are a few states that have incorporated the Common Rule into state law. See Lisa C. Edwards, 
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Food and Drug Administration regulations, which cover research that 
involves pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices.247 These Food and 
Drug Administration regulations impose disclosure requirements that are 
similar to those imposed by the Common Rule,248 and thus would expand 
the scope of a federal mandate to disclose financial interests to include 
research involving pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices not 
covered by the Common Rule.249 As a result, the Common Rule and its 
accompanying federal regulations apply to much research involving 
human participants, but it does not cover all research.250 Thus, if the 
scope of informed consent was expanded by modifying the federal 
regulations to mandate disclosure of researchers’ financial interests, there 
may still be donors who do not receive adequate informed consent. 
Finally, modifying current informed consent requirements to 
mandate disclosure of researchers’ financial interests is problematic 
because “true informed consent”251 will impose significant burdens on 
researchers in some situations. Specifically, true informed consent will 
be burdensome in situations where researchers are unable to adequately 
disclose their financial interests at the time of the donation, when 
informed consent is initially obtained.252 Researchers will be unable to 
give adequate disclosure when they are unaware of their specific 
financial interests.253 For example, the researcher may not anticipate that 
the research results would lead to a commercial use, such as a patent, 
until the research results are clear. This issue could also arise in the 
context of stored tissues, where a new commercial use may be 
discovered years later.254 True informed consent requires specific 
information, which blanket provisions, such as, “This research may be 
used for commercial purposes,” do not provide.255 Thus, in order to 
obtain true informed consent, these researchers would be required to re-
  
Note, Tissue Tug-of-War: A Comparison of International and U.S. Perspectives on the Regulation of 
Human Tissue Banks, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 639, 647 (2008). 
 247 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a) (2007). 
 248 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.27. 
 249 Research involving pharmaceutical drugs or medical devices automatically is covered 
by the U.S. Food and Drug regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a). However, it may not be covered by 
the Common Rule in cases where the research is entirely privately funded and occurs at an 
institution that has not assured the federal government that all research will comply with the 
Common Rule requirements. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.  
 250 For example, it would not cover privately-funded research that is not regulated by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, such as research on the genetic causes of a particular disease, at 
an institution that has not assured the federal government that the Common Rule requirements will 
be followed. See supra notes 245-249 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Daniel S. Strouse, Informed Consent to Genetic Research on Banked Human 
Tissue, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 135, 142 (2005). 
 252 See Greely, supra note 233, at 738-41 (describing how this issue generally applies to 
stored tissue samples). 
 253 See id. at 740-41. 
 254 When tissue samples are taken, they may be used for unforeseeable research. Strouse, 
supra note 251, at 136. Thus, these studies could result in unexpected commercial uses. 
 255 See id. at 142-43. 
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contact the donors once these uses became clear.256 However, such a 
requirement would be extremely costly for the researchers, especially 
since the researcher may not be able to contact some donors in order to 
obtain their consent.257 In short, requiring researchers to obtain true 
informed consent would conflict with the current federal policy to 
encourage researchers to engage in profitable uses of their research,258 as 
well as impose significant burdens on these researchers. 
Therefore, informed consent is an appealing solution for donors 
because it provides them with the information necessary to make a 
choice about the commercial use of their tissues.259 However, this 
disclosure is not currently required by state or federal informed consent 
laws,260 and modifying the federal Common Law to mandate disclosure 
of financial interests would be insufficient because the federal Common 
Law does not apply to all research.261 Additionally, although informed 
consent generally does not impose a significant burden on researchers,262 
it can impose a significant burden when researchers are unaware of their 
specific potential financial interests at the time of the donation.263 
IV. A PROPOSED UNIFORM DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS 
ACT 
It is clear that an increasingly commercial scientific research 
regime requires that donors have some degree of control over the use of 
their tissues for profitable purposes.264 As a result, scholars have analyzed 
several potential causes of action to protect donors.265 Of these, unjust 
enrichment seems to be the main cause of action that courts permit 
donors to use to prevent the use of their tissues for commercial 
purposes.266 However, unjust enrichment is ultimately unsatisfactory to 
both donors and researchers because it does not impose a clear, explicit 
duty of disclosure on researchers.267 In order for donors to actually make 
  
 256 See id. 
 257 Id. at 143. For a general discussion of informed consent issues posed by stored tissues 
and a proposed solution, see Greely, supra note 233. 
 258 See supra Part I. 
 259 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra notes 234-243 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 244-250 and accompanying text. 
 262 See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text. 
 263 See supra notes 252-258 and accompanying text. 
 264 Skloot, supra note 172 (“[A] growing number of activists . . . are arguing cases and 
pushing for federal regulations that would change the status quo by granting people rights to control 
their tissues.”). 
 265 See supra notes 10-11. 
 266 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1077-78 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims except for unjust enrichment claim). 
 267 See supra Part III.A; see also Greenfield, supra note 10, at 249; Korobkin, Default 
Rules, supra note 132, at 13. 
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a choice about whether to permit the use of their tissues for commercial 
purposes, disclosure is necessary. 
A modified version of property rights is also unsatisfactory for 
these donors because it also does not demand disclosure.268 Furthermore, 
recognizing property rights in donors’ bodily tissues risks commodifying 
body tissues.269 Finally, property rights may have detrimental effects on 
the scientific research process.270 Given these issues, and the lack of 
certainty of the full ramifications of recognizing a property interest in 
donors’ tissues,271 such an extreme step should not be taken unless no 
other alternatives provide an adequate solution. 
Informed consent initially appears to be a plausible solution 
because it poses a relatively small burden on the researcher272 and 
provides donors with disclosure.273 However, true informed consent 
would be difficult to achieve since some researchers are unaware of their 
financial interests at the time informed consent is typically obtained.274 
These researchers would only be able to provide a statement describing 
the potential for the research results to be used for commercial purposes, 
which many scholars contend does not constitute truly informed 
consent.275 Furthermore, the current informed consent requirements are 
inadequate because they do not mandate disclosure of potential 
commercial uses of research such as patents.276 
As a result, this Part argues that a legislative solution is 
necessary to sufficiently balance the interests of both researchers and 
donors.277 This solution would consist of two parts: a disclosure 
requirement and an enforcement mechanism for donors whose tissue has 
been used for commercial purposes without the donors’ permission. 
Finally, this legislative scheme must be implemented in a manner such 
that it applies to all research. 
  
 268 See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text. 
 269 See supra notes 175-191 and accompanying text. 
 270 See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text. 
 271 See Goodwin, supra note 141, at 370-71. 
 272 See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text. 
 273 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. 
 274 See supra notes 252-258 and accompanying text. 
 275 See, e.g., Strouse, supra note 251, at 142-43. 
 276 See supra notes 234-243 and accompanying text. 
 277 Although this legislative solution is largely based on informed consent, this Note will 
refer to it as a disclosure mechanism in recognition of the argument that true informed consent 
would require disclosure of the specific financial interests. See e.g., Strouse, supra note 251, at 
142-43. 
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A. The Proposed Legislative Scheme 
1. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements 
The proposed legislative solution would require researchers to 
disclose potential commercial applications of the research, such as the 
potential for patents,278 within the existing informed consent form. The 
extent of the required disclosure would vary based on the foreseeability 
of the future commercial applications.279 If the researcher could 
reasonably expect that the research would result in specific commercial 
applications, the researcher would be required to disclose those specific 
financial interests. For example, if research intended to determine a 
particular gene responsible for a disease, and the researcher intends to 
obtain a gene patent if the gene is discovered, then the researcher would 
be required to include a disclosure statement stating, “The results of this 
research may result in a gene patent.”280 
Since researchers are not always aware of the commercial uses 
that may result from a study,281 researchers that want to leave open the 
possibility of using the results for unspecific commercial purposes may 
meet the disclosure requirements by explaining to the donor that the 
tissue may be used for future proprietary uses and describing what this 
may entail. Thus, a statement such as, “This study may result in the 
development of commercial uses, in which the researcher may have a 
financial stake,” would be insufficient because it does not sufficiently 
inform the donor how the research may result in commercial uses.282 
Instead, a more specific statement is required, such as, “This study may 
result in the development of commercial uses from which the researcher 
may profit. Although no current commercial uses are anticipated, 
unexpected uses may arise. For example, the researcher may profit by 
licensing a patent, or developing a medical product, that results from the 
research.” 
Requiring researchers to specifically disclose all reasonably 
foreseeable commercial uses in addition to permitting sufficiently 
specific blanket disclosure statements of the potential commercial uses 
attempts to balance the interests of both researchers and donors. On the 
one hand, these statements adequately protect donors because they alert 
the donor to the possibility that the tissues may be used for commercial 
  
 278 For a further explanation of these potential commercial uses, see supra Part I. 
 279 Professor Greely has proposed similar disclosure requirements in addressing the 
problems that have arisen regarding informed consent for stored tissues. See Greely, supra note 233, 
at 755-56. 
 280 This scenario is adapted from the facts of Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. 
Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066-68 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 281 See supra notes 252-258 and accompanying text. 
 282 Thus, the vast majority of current financial disclosure provisions would be insufficient. 
See supra note 242. 
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purposes, and when feasible, those purposes are identified, thus 
permitting the donor to express any objections.283 This would permit 
donors with objections to enter into negotiations with the researchers, or, 
if the researchers are uninterested in negotiating with the donor, the 
donors could seek out other researchers with similar views.284 At the 
same time, researchers are not required to do the impossible and 
anticipate every possible commercial use of the research results.285 
Additionally, researchers are not required to re-contact donors every time 
a potential new profitable use of the research arises.286 
Furthermore, these disclosure requirements are largely consistent 
with the current federal policy regarding permissible financial 
disclosures, which allows financial disclosures so long as they are 
sufficiently specific.287 These disclosure requirements simply go a step 
further by mandating the disclosure of direct financial interests in the 
research. Additionally, mandatory disclosure is consistent with many 
medical and research organizations’ policy positions, which urge the 
disclosure of financial interests.288 However, this solution provides 
consistent disclosure requirements across all research areas.289 
Furthermore, mandatory disclosure of direct financial interests in 
research is reconcilable with the federal government’s policy of 
  
 283 For a description of these potential objections, see supra Part II. 
 284 For example, these donors may prefer to donate their tissues to “open-source” research 
projects, such as those associated with the Biological Innovation for Open Society initiative, that 
intend to keep their results in the public domain. See Pollack, Open-Source Practices, supra note 94. 
 285 See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text. 
 286 See id. 
 287 See supra note 236. State policies are not addressed here because most states have not 
expressed a clear policy. Rather, courts have had to deal with these issues when they arise. See, e.g., 
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona II), 490 F.3d 667, 672-73 (8th Cir. 2007) (donors seeking to 
retain control over possession of their tissues); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 
480 (Cal. 1990) (use of tissues for commercial purposes in the therapeutic research context); 
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066-68 (S.D. Fla. 
2003) (use of tissues for commercial purposes in the non-therapeutic research context). 
 288 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FIN. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, 
ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING 
PROGRESS II 11 (2002), available at http://www.aamc.org/research/coi/2002coireport.pdf (requiring 
all financial conflicts of interests be disclosed to the IRB, which then should determine which are 
disclosed to research participants); TASK FORCE ON RESEARCH ACCOUNTABILITY, ASS’N OF AM. 
UNIVS., REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ii (2001), 
available at http://www.aau.edu/research/COI.01.pdf (providing the following guidelines for dealing 
with financial conflicts of interest: “1) disclose always; 2) manage the conflict in most cases; 3) 
prohibit the activity when necessary to protect the public interest or the interest of the university”); 
AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 241, E-2.08 (“Physicians contemplating the commercial use of 
human tissue should abide by the following guidelines: . . . . (2) Potential commercial applications 
must be disclosed to the patient before a profit is realized on products developed from biological 
materials. (3) Human tissue and its products may not be used for commercial purposes without the 
informed consent of the patient who provided the original cellular material.”); see also Andrews, 
Benefits of Biobanks, supra note 71, at 25. 
 289 Different organizations codes apply in different contexts. For example, the Association 
of American Medical Colleges’ position would apply to research performed by its member medical 
schools, whereas the Association of American Universities’ position would apply to research 
performed by its member medical schools. See supra note 288. 
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encouraging the commercial use of scientific research,290 since it does not 
prevent commercial uses, but rather permits donors with objections to 
such uses to express them. 
2. Enforcement Mechanisms 
In order for the mandatory disclosure requirements to be 
effective, donors must be able to enforce the requirements when donors’ 
tissues are used for commercial purposes without their express 
permission. This Note argues that a donor that wishes to bring an action 
for failure to obtain permission must prove three elements: (1) the 
donor’s tissues were used in research by the defendant, (2) the research 
in which the tissues were used resulted in a commercial use, and (3) the 
donor did not consent to the use of the biological tissues for commercial 
research, either because the researcher did not adequately disclose these 
uses or because the tissues were used in disregard of the donor’s refusal 
to consent to commercial uses. These requirements are loosely based off 
the traditional elements of informed consent actions.291 However, they are 
modified because the traditional informed consent action is designed to 
remedy a physical harm.292 In contrast, the donor harmed by a 
commercial use of research has suffered a harm that is better classified as 
a “dignitary harm[].”293 Thus, these requirements are intended to ensure 
the donor did in fact suffer a cognizable harm as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct. In order to be harmed under this mandated 
disclosure regime, there must be a commercial use of the research. 
If the donor succeeds in proving these requirements, there are a 
number of remedies that may be available to the donor. The donor may 
be able to prove general damages if he or she has suffered physical or 
economic harm. For example, the donor may experience economic harm 
if the donor participated in research on a particular genetic disorder and 
now is unable to receive the screening test for that genetic disorder 
without paying an exorbitant fee. However, since the donor will often be 
  
 290 See supra Part I. Indeed, the Department of Health and Human Services has issued 
guidelines for when researchers may want to disclose financial interests. See 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 
26,395-97 (May 12, 2004). 
 291 In particular, the traditional common law action for informed consent requires: 
(1) [A researcher’s] duty to disclose material risks; (2) the failure to disclose or 
inadequate disclosure of those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to 
disclose, [the research participant] consented to [research] to which she otherwise would 
not have consented; and (4) [the research participant] was injured by the proposed 
[research]. 
Oberdorfer, supra note 216, at 371. 
 292 See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.  
 293 See Dina Mishra, Comment, ‘Tis Better to Receive: The Case for an Organ Donee’s 
Cause of Action, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 403, 408 (2007). For example, a research subject may 
think, “It’s my blood, damn it. How can they use it without my permission?” Greely, supra note 233, 
at 758. 
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unable to prove physical or economic harm where the sole injury is the 
emotional harm of having the donated tissues used for unauthorized 
commercial uses,294 statutory damages should also be provided, which the 
donor could elect as an alternative to proving general damages. The 
statutory damages would be calculated by dividing the total profits 
received by the researcher by the total number of donors used for the 
research.295 In situations where the failure to disclose was intentional, the 
donor would be entitled to treble damages.296 Regardless of the relief 
received, a donor that is successful on the merits would be entitled to 
attorney’s fees.297 
Additionally, donors may also be able to obtain equitable 
remedies, such as an injunction or disgorgement of profits, when the 
court determines that justice so requires.298 These remedies should be 
limited in use to circumstances where the researcher’s conduct is 
particularly culpable.299 For example, if a researcher knows that the 
research may result in a patent or other commercial use but intentionally 
fails to disclose this information to donors, an injunction or disgorgement 
of profits may be appropriate. In these circumstances, these severe 
remedies are necessary to deter particularly culpable abuses by 
researchers. Thus, the application of these remedies would not 
significantly differ from their traditional applications by courts.300 
B. Implementation of the Legislative Proposal 
In order for donors’ interests to be fully protected, disclosure 
must be required by all researchers.301 Ideally, this would occur by the 
federal government passing the legislative proposal. However, this would 
  
 294 For example, in Greenberg, the plaintiff’s harm was that they “were . . . denied the 
benefits of their prolonged efforts in contributing time, information, monies and blood, tissue, urine 
and autopsy samples toward research that they thought was designed for non-commercial purposes 
for the good of the public at large.” Complaint ¶ 39, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research 
Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 02-22244-CIV-MORENO). 
 295 Admittedly, this amount may be low in situations where the researcher has not 
received much money in profits or in situations where there have been many donors. However, this 
formula is selected because it would require that the researcher disgorge all profits if every donor 
brought an action. 
 296 In other words, the donor would receive three times the damages determined by the 
initial statutory calculation. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for 
“damages”). 
 297 These attorney’s fees will hopefully encourage donors to bring actions against 
researchers even where their ultimate recovery may be relatively low. 
 298 Thus, plaintiffs are not foreclosed from the flexible equitable remedies provided by an 
unjust enrichment action. See supra Part III.A. However, since clear disclosure requirements are 
defined, see supra Part IV.A., researchers are not subject to the uncertainty of unjust enrichment 
actions. See supra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.  
 299 In other words, when the researcher’s conduct is particularly blameworthy. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for “culpable”). 
 300 For a discussion of courts’ application of the disgorgement of profits remedy, see 
supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text. 
 301 See supra notes 241-250 and accompanying text. 
2009] BALANCING THE INTERESTS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 1509 
be inconsistent with the federal government’s current policy of only 
regulating federally-funded and FDA regulated research.302 Since the 
federal government is presumably unlikely to change this policy, a more 
plausible solution is to initially seek to amend the Common Rule to 
conform to the proposed disclosure requirements.303 This would result in 
the protection of most donors.304 
Ideally, in order to ensure protection of all donors, the states 
should then be encouraged to also enact the proposed legislative solution. 
Although this raises the possibility that state and federal laws may 
conflict,305 this outcome is unlikely. Much research is already governed 
by both state and federal laws.306 Currently, there has not been a problem 
with these sets of laws conflicting.307 Furthermore, a research 
organization should be able to comply with both sets of rules unless they 
conflict. In order for the rules to conflict, the state would have to prohibit 
the researcher from disclosing certain financial conflicts. Given the vast 
consensus that these conflicts should be disclosed,308 this outcome is 
unlikely. 
  
 302 See supra notes 244-250 and accompanying text. Additionally, the federal government 
may not have the power to pass such a policy. The Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 3, may not grant Congress the power because most research occurs within a single state using 
participants from that state. Only the research results are then entered into interstate commerce. 
 303 Like the other provisions of the Common Rule, Congress has the power to do this 
because it has the power to restrict the use of federal funds. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (explaining that the power of Congress to attach 
strings to federal funds is very broad). 
 304 Admittedly, it would only protect most donors, not all donors. See supra notes 244-
250 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, it would be better than the current system. Indeed, 
Congress should expand the scope of coverage by additionally providing that the disclosure 
provision applies to all tissue samples. Currently, tissue samples that are completely anonymous may 
not be subject to the Common Rule. See Michael D. Volk, Jr., Christine Meis McAuliffe & May 
Mowzoon, Genebank Management: A Review of Salient Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 45 
JURIMETRICS J. 205, 218 (2005). However, making samples anonymous does not prevent the harm 
that donors experience when their tissues are impermissibly used for commercial purposes. Thus, 
anonymous samples should also be subject to mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 305 State and federal laws may conflict if the state legislature does not enact the proposed 
act but rather drafts its own legislation on the issue. 
 306 The research is always governed by the state informed consent law. See, e.g., supra 
notes 238-240 and accompanying text. In addition, many of those research projects are also 
governed by the federal Common Rule. See supra notes 245-250 and accompanying text. 
 307 Indeed, when state and federal laws differ, it is often because the state laws are more 
stringent than the federal regulations. Compare Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 
858 (Md. 2001) (holding that “in Maryland a parent, appropriate relative, or other applicable 
surrogate, cannot consent to the participation of a child or other person under legal disability in 
nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the 
subject” (emphasis added)), with 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (2007) (permitting research on children that 
poses only “minimal risk” so long as the child’s assent and the parent’s or guardian’s permission is 
obtained(emphasis added)).  
 308 See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text. 
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C. Additional Protection Using Contracts 
A possible criticism is that these disclosures will not provide 
donors with sufficient protection because donors will not have sufficient 
bargaining power to negotiate with the researcher. Indeed, in the case of 
individuals, the researcher may present this disclosure as a “take-it-or-
leave-it” provision. Unless the donors’ tissues are particularly valuable,309 
the donors may lack bargaining power since the researchers are able to 
acquire the same materials from another donor. However, donors are still 
adequately protected. Even if they are unable to negotiate with one 
researcher, they may still seek out a researcher that would use their 
tissues in the manner they desire. Furthermore, groups of donors, such as 
patient advocacy organizations, may have sufficient bargaining power to 
negotiate with the researchers.310 Disclosure will facilitate these 
negotiations by ensuring that the groups are aware of the potential uses 
of their tissues.311 Thus, they will be able to initiate negotiations if they 
desire to change the terms of the use. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Scientific research is increasingly being used for profitable 
purposes.312 At the same time, there are many reasons why donors may 
object to the use of their donations for these uses.313 As a result, donors’ 
interests must be protected. However, these protections must also take 
into account researchers’ interests. Currently, most of the proposed 
solutions do not adequately balance the researchers’ and donors’ 
interests. As a result, this Note proposes a mandatory disclosure 
regime.314 This regime would inform donors of potential commercial 
uses.315 At the same time, the regime would impose a relatively slight 
burden on researchers.316 Finally, the regime provides a cause of action 
through which donors can enforce the mandatory disclosure 
  
 309 For example, the donors’ tissues may have a unique characteristic that makes those 
particular tissues valuable to the researcher. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 
P.2d 479, 481-83 (Cal. 1990) (researchers were initially aware that Moore’s cells were valuable). 
 310 For example, PXE International, a patient advocacy group for pseudoxanthoma 
elasticum (PXE), was able to successfully negotiate with researchers. See Baird, supra note 10, at 
335. PXE International was able to negotiate a portion of the patent rights in return for access to its 
tissue bank and database of family information. Id. Its purpose in entering into these negotiations 
was to ensure affordable access to any advancements resulting from the research, such as a test for 
the disease. Id. 
 311 For example, the Greenberg plaintiffs would have likely negotiated with the 
researcher before the research began if they had been aware that the researcher contemplated 
commercial uses. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 312 See supra Part I. 
 313 See supra Part II. 
 314 See supra Part IV. 
 315 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 316 See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text. 
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requirements.317 Thus, unlike other proposed solutions,318 this regime 
achieves a balance between donors’ and researchers’ interests while 
granting donors some control over the commercial use of their tissue 
donations. 
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 317 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 318 See supra Part III. 
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